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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

ARNOLD L. MEDINA,

Case No. 970477-CA
Priority No. 15

Defendant/Appellee.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(2) (1985), Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2) (e) (1996), Rule 26(3) (a) of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, and State v. Troyerf 910 P.2d 1182 (Utah
1995).

The trial court signed the final written order of

dismissal on July 22, 1997.

R. 31.

STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A.
erroneous?

Were the trial court's findings of fact clearly

Standard of Review.

Factual findings underlying trial

courts7 decisions to grant motions to suppress are reviewed under
the "clearly erroneous standard."

Troyer, 910 P.2d 1182.

A

reviewing court "will find clear error only if [it decides] that
the factual findings made by the trial court are not adequately
supported by the record."

Id.

Facts are considered "in a light

most favorable to the trial court's determination."
B.

Id.

Given the trial court's findings of fact, did the

court properly apply the law in concluding that the officer's
initial suspicion of criminal activity was dispelled in the
course of investigation prior to the frisk?
Standard of Review.

An appellate court "reviews the

trial court's conclusions of law based on such facts under a
correctness standard, [citation omitted], according no deference
to its legal conclusions."
C.

Id.

Does the City's failure to marshal the evidence in

support of the trial court's findings require that this Court
affirm?
Standard of Review.

When a trial court's findings are

challenged, the party claiming that the findings are clearly
erroneous must marshal all evidence supporting the findings and
must then show how this marshaled evidence is insufficient to
support the findings even when viewed in the light most favorable
to the verdict.

See State v. Pilling, 875 P.2d 604 (Utah App.

1994) .

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant/Appellee Arnold L. Medina ("Medina" or
"Appellee") was charged by Salt Lake City ("the City") with the
offenses of Possession of a Controlled Substance, Salt Lake City
Code § 11.24.020; Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, Salt Lake
City Code § 11.20.040; and Carrying a Concealed Weapon, Salt Lake
City Code § 11.48.070.

Medina entered a plea of not guilty at

arraignment to the charges on January 16, 1997.
On April 16, 1997, Medina, through counsel, filed a
Motion to Suppress Evidence based on lack of reasonable suspicion
to frisk.

On April 17, 1997, the trial court held an evidentiary

hearing on Medina's motion.

On April 22, 1997, the Honorable

Robert K. Hilder issued his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law granting Medina's motion to suppress.

See Addendum

containing a copy of the court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law.
On July 9, 1997, the City indicated that the Court's
order effectively prevented any further prosecution of the case;
accordingly, the Court dismissed the case against Medina on
July 23, 1997.

Thereafter, the City filed a timely notice of

appeal.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On December 22, 1996 at approximately 12:45 a.m., Officer
Wooldridge ("Wooldridge") was patrolling in the area of 915 South
State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah.
3

Wooldridge was employed at

that time as a community support division, community mobilization
officer.

R. 6.

He was doing an overtime shift for DUI

suppression and was checking the area for DUI suspects because of
the proximity of the Durango Bar and the Red Belle Saloon.

R. 9.

Wooldridge proceeded down an alley behind the Red Belle
driving southbound in uniform but in an unmarked police car.

The

alley was dark and the officer was driving without headlights.
R. 10.

At this time, the officer observed Medina and another

older gentleman around a parked vehicle behind the Red Belle.
R. 10-11.

The officer noticed that Medina was trying to get into

a parked vehicle with what appeared to be some type of tools.
R. 11.
Wooldridge called for backup but he proceeded to approach
the two individuals alone.

As Wooldridge approached the

individuals, he recognized Medina.

Wooldridge knew Medina as an

employee of the Red Belle.

The officer had had previous

R. 12.

discussions with Medina at the Red Belle about public licensing
issues, recurrent problems within the area and just general
conversation.

He had never seen Medina act violently.

R. 13.

Additionally, the officer was not personally aware of Medina
having a reputation for carrying a gun.

R. 21.

Neither did the

officer have any specific valid information that Medina
personally was violent or associated with violent groups.
R. 21-23.
The officer observed that the other man with Medina was
holding a grocery bag.

R. 16.

As Wooldridge approached the two
4

individuals, he noted that Medina was holding both a coat hanger
and a screwdriver.

Wooldridge did not notice any other tools or

implements of any kind.

Neither did he notice any suspicious

bulges or items in Medina's clothing.

R. 14.

As Wooldridge

approached, Medina offered information that the vehicle was his
and that he had left his car keys inside.

R. 15-16.

later confirmed that the car was indeed Medina's.

The officer

R. 16.

The

officer ordered both individuals to keep their hands in plain
view and both complied.

R. 28.

his hands in his pockets.

Medina did not attempt to put

R. 28.

As the officer searched

Medina, the other individual was outside of the officer's view.
R. 27.

Although Wooldridge testified that he had some concern

because he did not know the other individual in the alley, the
officer frisked Medina, the person that was known to him first.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court's factual findings were correct, not
clearly erroneous, and were adequately supported by the record.
In properly applying the law to those facts, the court correctly
concluded that although the officer had a reasonable suspicion to
initially investigate, he became aware of information prior to
the frisk that would dispel the officer's concerns.

Accordingly,

the officer was not justified in searching Medina.
Additionally, the City failed to marshal the evidence in
support of the trial court's findings and then demonstrate that
even viewing it in the light most favorable to the court, the
5

evidence was insufficient to support the findings.

Affirmance of

the trial court's order suppressing evidence is therefore
required.

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT WERE
PROPERLY SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD.
The trial court's findings of fact were supported by the
evidence; therefore, when applying a clearly erroneous standard,
this Court should uphold such facts as found by the lower court.
See Addendum.

As provided by Trover, 910 P.2d 1182, a reviewing

court "will find clear error only if [it decides] that the
factual findings made by the trial court are not adequately
supported by the record."

Id.

Further, facts are considered "in

a light most favorable to the trial court's determination."

Id.

The City erroneously argues that the trial court failed
to evaluate the significance of uncontroverted facts.

In so

arguing, the City states that circumstantial information
available to the officer in this case increased concern for
officer safety and justified the frisk.
true as properly found by the court.

i

Just the opposite was

All of the court's findings

of fact were amply supported by the court record.

Accordingly,

this Court should uphold the lower court's findings.
The trial court found that on December 22, 1996,
Wooldridge was patrolling in the area of 915 South State Street,
Salt Lake City.

See Addendum.

Wooldridge proceeded down an
6

alley, which alley is notorious for criminal activity, at which
time he observed two males apparently attempting to enter a motor
vehicle without the use of a key.

See Addendum.

The court

further found that the officer called for backup but proceeded to
approach the two individuals alone.

See Addendum.

These findings are supported by the record.

At the

suppression hearing, Wooldridge testified that he was employed as
a Salt Lake City Police Officer on December 22, 1996 as a
community support division, community mobilization officer.
R. 6.

Wooldridge was doing an overtime shift for DUI suppression

and given the opportunity with the Durango Bar and the Red Belle
Saloon in the area he was checking for DUI suspects.

R. 9.

Wooldridge testified that he was driving southbound in
the alley in uniform but in an unmarked police car.

As he was

going down the alley, he saw Medina and another older gentleman
around a parked vehicle behind the Red Belle.

R. 11.

He

observed Medina trying to get into the parked vehicle with what
appeared to be some type of tools.

R. 11.

The officer later

identified those tools as a screwdriver and a hanger.

R. 12.

Wooldridge did not notice any other tools or implements
of any kind.

Neither did he notice any suspicious bulges or

items in Appellee's clothing.

R. 29-30.

Wooldridge did not

recall if he was in his vehicle or if he was in the process of
getting out of his vehicle when he called for backup.

R. 18-19.

However, he approached Medina immediately after he requested
assistance.

R. 11.

7

Based upon these findings, the court held that the
officer was justified in his initial stop of Medina and his
companion.

The officer's initial observation of an

unidentifiable person attempting to gain entry to a vehicle with
use of a coat hanger and screwdriver in a dark alley gave the
officer a reasonable suspicion that the person was attempting to
unlawfully gain access to the vehicle.

Therefore, the officer

had a legitimate basis to approach the individual.

See Addendum.

However, the court found that upon approaching Medina and
the other individual, the officer was able to identify Medina as
an employee of the adjacent establishment.

See Addendum.

The

court further found that Wooldridge had had numerous
conversations with Medina.

See Addendum.

Although the officer

knew of a criminal record, the court found that Wooldridge did
not specifically identify any history of violence during his
testimony.

Accordingly, the court concluded that the officer's

suspicions were dispelled.

See Addendum.

In so concluding that

the officer's fears were dispelled and the need for a frisk
dissipated, the court implicitly found that reasonable inquiries
were warranted in this case.
These findings were also supported by the officer's
testimony at the suppression hearing.

The officer testified that

he recognized Medina as he approached him on foot before he
frisked him.

R. 19.

The vehicle into which Medina was trying to

gain access was located behind the Red Belle.

R. 11.

The

officer further testified that he and Medina "talked aibout the
8

vehicle . . .

I believe he reported it was his.

He had locked

his keys in the vehicle and was trying to get back into the
vehicle."

R. 15.

When the officer was asked, "When did you ask

him about what he was doing with the car?" he responded, "I
believe he just volunteered that upon initial contact."
R. 15-16.
Further, the officer testified that he frequently
encountered Medina at the Red Belle where he was employed.
R. 12.

At the Red Belle, they had discussed "public licensing

issues, recurrent problems within the area . . . Just general
conversation."

R. 13.

Wooldridge testified that he had spoken

with Medina about four to seven times and Media appeared
generally to be very amiable and willing to cooperate with him.
R. 20.

Medina had never tried to strike him or do anything

physical toward him.

R. 20.

The officer was not aware of Medina

having a reputation for carrying a gun.
never seen Medina act violently.

R. 13.

R. 21.

The officer had

Neither did the officer

have any specific valid information that Medina personally was
violent or associated with violent groups.

R. 21-23.

The prosecution argues that the court's findings of fact,
particularly the officer's prior acquaintance with Medina,
presents a slippery slope due the familiarity being based only on
a few prior encounters between the two.

However, the fact that

the officer knew who Medina was and knew his employment in the
adjacent business gave credibility to Medina's statement that he
had locked his keys in the car.

The familiarity between these

two individuals is merely one more piece to the surrounding
circumstances to support the likelihood that Medina was telling
the truth and was not involved in any illegal activity and to
dispel a concern for officer safety.
The officer did not testify to Medina acting nervous when
confronted or attempting to get away, but instead was cooperative
and offering information.

Medina complied with the officer when

told to keep his hands in plain view.

R. 28.

Medina did not

attempt to reach into his pockets or use his tools as weapons or
go for anything else.

R. 29.

Finally, the court found that although Wooldridge
testified that he had some concern because he didn't know the
other individual in the alley, the officer frisked Medina, the
person that was known to him, first; therefore, the Court found
that Wooldridge did not objectively evidence any heightened
concern about the unknown person.

See Addendum.

At the hearing, the officer testified that the individual
present with Medina was standing holding a paper bag.

R. 16.

The officer did not testify that this individual appeared in any
way to be acting as a lookout.

Additionally, there was no

testimony that either party attempted to run upon the officer
approaching, and, in fact, they were completely cooperative in
responding to the officer.

R. 27-28.

Additionally, the officer did not objectively point out a
concern for being outnumbered.

While frisking Medina, he allowed

the other gentleman to be outside his view.
10

R. 27.

If an

officer were concerned about the possibility of being attacked
because of being outnumbered, he surely would not allow one
suspect to be behind him while he addressed the other.
Accordingly, the court properly found that the officer was not
concerned for his safety because of the number of people present.
The prosecution argues that because the officer in this
case was alone, he had a basis to search both individuals for his
safety, which concern may not have been present had other
officers been present.

However, the fact that the officer did

not wait for backup supports the court's analysis that the
officer was not concerned for his safety.

Accordingly, the trial

court's findings of fact were properly supported by the record
and were not clearly erroneous.

POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY APPLIED THE
LAW IN FINDING NO REASONABLE SUSPICION TO FRISK.
In State v. White, 856 P.2d 656 (Utah App. 1993), the
Utah Court of Appeals held that
[t]o justify a frisk, the totality of available
information must sustain an officer's reasonable
suspicion of both criminal activity and danger
throughout the initial investigatory stages of
the encounter and until the frisk actually
commenced. In other words, even when reasonable
suspicion is conceded as justifying the initial
stop . . . there must be separately established
reasonable suspicion of criminal behavior when
the frisk takes place, as well as a reasonable
basis for believing there exists a danger to
officers or others in the vicinity.
Id. at 662.
In White, police approached the defendant sitting in a
li

parked car with a woman in an alley.

The police had previously

been called by an informant who told police that the defendant
had violated his parole by being involved in a domestic incident
earlier the same day and using cocaine in the parked car.

Based

upon this report, several police surrounded the defendant,
ordered him out of the vehicle and searched him.
In evaluating the reasonableness of the stop and search,
the White court first looked to the Terry holding that a frisk is
reasonable " (1) 'where a police officer observes unusual conduct'
which he interprets 'in light of his experience' as indicating
possible criminal activity and present danger, (2) 'where in the
course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a
policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and (3) where nothing
in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his
reasonable fear for his own or other's safety.'"

Id. citing

Terry v. Ohio, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1884 (1968).
Based upon this, the White court found and the defense
had stipulated that the first requirement was met.

The police

officers had been made aware of possible criminal activity, and
therefore the initial stop and investigation was appropriate.
However, in White, the second two requirements of Terry were not
met.

Although the officers had received a report of criminal

activity, they did not personally observe anything indicative of
criminal conduct.

The court also noted the fact that they

approached the defendant in the day and had been given no prior
information that the defendant was armed.
12

Additionally, the

court noted the fact that the defendant appeared calm and
cooperative.

All of these factors created an environment in

which the responding officers could question the defendant
without fear for their safety.

In doing so, the court noted that

even "if preliminary inquiry is not required, commentary has
indicated that . . . xIf by investigation or happenstance the
quantum of evidence needed to justify a forcible stop has
dissipated during this interval, then it is not permissible to
frisk. /H
Search

White, 856 P.2d 656 at 663, citing Wayne R. LaFave, 3

and Seizure,

§ 9.4(a) at 502 (2nd ed. 1987).

As in White, the police officer in this case had a
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was occurring and,
therefore, had an initial basis to stop Medina to investigate.
The officer's basis for stopping Medina was made by personal
observation of a possible vehicle burglary.

However, as in

White, the totality of circumstances created an environment
dispelling the initial concern and prohibiting the frisk.

Here,

the officer was able to identify Medina as someone who worked at
the adjacent establishment, the Red Belle Saloon.

The officer

had several prior contacts with Medina and had found him to be
generally amiable, never showing any violence toward the officer.
The officer did not have any information that Medina was armed or
had any reputation for carrying a weapon or for acting in a
violent manner.
As the officer approached, Medina volunteered that the
vehicle was his and that he had locked his keys in the car.
13

There was no testimony that Medina acted nervous or attempted to
get away from the officer.

He complied with the officer's orders

in keeping his hands in plain view.
into his pockets.

He did not attempt to reach

The other individual with Medina was carrying

a grocery bag, and although the officer stated that he had some
concerns that there were two individuals against one, he allowed
the other individual to remain out of his sight as he searched
Medina.
All of the information available to the officer as he
approached Medina undermined the initial suspicion of criminal
activity and undermined any concern for officer safety.
Accordingly, the lower court appropriately applied the law as set
out in Terry and White.

The court properly found that the

officer's stop of Appellee and his companion was completely
justified but before he made reasonable inquiries, the officer
engaged in a Terry frisk of Medina.

The Court additionally found

that a reasonable officer's fears would have been appropriately
dispelled and that the need for a frisk dissipated before the
frisk was undertaken.
The City argues that this fact situation gave the police
officer a basis for an automatic frisk.

In doing so, the City

points to the facts that the officer approached two individuals
who appeared to be breaking into a car at night in a dark alley.
First, the statements made by the White court regarding automatic
frisks were dicta and not to be applied here.

Additionally, the

automatic frisk must still stand up to the standard as set forth
14

in Terry.

There still must exist a reasonable suspicion that the

individual is involved in criminal activity and there must exist
a reasonable suspicion that the individual is a danger to the
safety of the officer or someone else.

In some circumstances,

the evidence of both is so great at the initial encounter that
the officer may have a basis to search the individual immediately
without having to make initial inquiry.

However, this situation

is not such a case.
Given the totality of information available to the
officer at the time, there was no reasonable suspicion that
Medina was engaged in criminal activity nor that the officer's
safety was in danger.

Accordingly, this Court should ignore any

argument regarding applying an automatic frisk to the case at
hand.

POINT III. THE CITY FAILED TO MARSHAL THE
EVIDENCE AND THEN DEMONSTRATE THAT IT WAS
INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE FINDINGS.
In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support
the court's findings, the prosecution must "marshal all evidence
supporting

the [ruling] and must then show how this marshaled

evidence is insufficient to support the [ruling] even when viewed
in the light most favorable to the [ruling]."
at 607-608.

Pilling, 875 P.2d

In Pilling, the court addressed the issue of

marshaling evidence in the case of a jury verdict.

However, the

standard is the same for a court ruling when challenging the
court's findings.
15

In this case, the City failed to address the facts as the
court found them.

Instead, the City speculated on what

inferences the facts could have supported.

The City points to

the fact that the officer knew Appellee worked at a local
establishment to support the possibility of criminal activity.
See Appellant's Brief at 20-21.

This fact, given the totality of

circumstances, supported Appellee's statement to the officer that
the vehicle was his and he had locked his keys inside.

Instead,

the City argues that employees can often take advantage of their
employment to commit crime.

Id.

This argument is entirely

speculative, misdirected and disregards the trial court's finding
that the officer's prior relationship with Appellee served to
dispel fears of criminal activity and safety.

Employment does

not provide a special opportunity for an employee to break into a
vehicle after hours.
The City further argues that the officer's familiarity
with Medina should not have played a role in this case and
personal knowledge should only be relevant to the officer's
evaluation if it is a friend of twenty years that the officer has
seen drive his car on a daily basis down the main street at noon.
See Appellant's Brief at 21.

Again, the City speculates on these

facts to the extreme instead of addressing them in the totality
of circumstances in a light most favorable to the trial court's
findings.

Such speculation is further exaggerated in arguing

that because of the poor lighting, there could have been a
suspicious bulge that the officer was unable to see.
16

The trial

court specifically found that the officer did not see any bulges.
Based upon the City's failure to marshal the evidence as found by
the Court and then state why such findings still should fail,
this Court should dismiss the City's appeal.

See Pilling, 875

P.2d 604.

CONCLUSION
In this case, the trial court made proper findings as
supported by the record.

Such findings of fact created a

totality of circumstances in which the officer had a reasonable
suspicion to initially stop Medina but did not have a reasonable
suspicion to frisk.

The trial court properly applied the law,

particularly White, in determining that a reasonable officer's
fears would have been appropriately dispelled and the need for a
frisk dissipated before the frisk was undertaken based upon the
information available to the officer.

Finally, the City has

failed to marshal the evidence as found by the trial court and
then demonstrate that even viewing it in the light most favorable
to the court, the evidence was insufficient to support the
findings.

Accordingly, this Court should affirm the trial

court's order suppressing the evidence against Medina.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this T ? 3

day of December, 1997.
/

WMH/A

(A

STEBHAN
TEBHANIE AMES
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, STEPHANIE AMES, have caused to be delivered eight
copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 23 0 South
500 East, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and two copies
to the Office of the City Prosecutor, 451 South 200 East, Room
125, Salt Lake City, Utah

84111, this ^23

day of December,

C

1997.

DELIVERED to the Utah Court of Appeals and the Office of
the City Prosecutor as indicated above this
December, 1997.
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ADDENDUM

THIRD DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION II
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SALT LAKE CITY,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
CASE No. 971000045 MC
ARNOLD MEDINA,
Judge Robert K. Hilder
Defendant.

This matter came before the Court for a hearing on the Defendant's Motion to
Suppress based on no reasonable suspicion to frisk. Plaintiff was represented by Virginia
Ward and Defendant was represented by Stephanie Ames. The Court heard the testimony of
the arresting officer, Steven Wooldridge and heard argument of counsel. Following the
hearing on April 17, 1997, the Court took the matter under advisement to consider case law
proffered by counsel. Having now considered both the governing case law and the evidence,
the Court enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On December 22, 1996, Officer Wooldridge was patrolling in the area of 915 South

State Street, Salt Lake City.
2.

Officer Wooldridge proceeded down an alley, which alley is notorious for criminal

activity, at which time he observed two males apparently attempting to enter a motor vehicle
without the use of a key.

3.

Officer Wooldridge called for back-up, but he proceeded to approach the two

individuals alone.
4.

As Officer Wooldridge approached the individuals, he noted that one of them was

defendant, Arnold Medina. Mr. Medina was known to Officer Wooldridge as an employee
of an establishment located in the immediate area where he was observed by the officer.
5.

In addition, as Officer Wooldridge approached the two individuals, he noted that Mr.

Medina was holding both a coat hanger and a screw driver. Officer Wooldridge did not
notice any other tools or implements of any kind, neither did he notice any suspicious bulges
or items in defendant's clothing.
6.

Officer Wooldridge had had numerous conversations with defendant, knew he was an

employee of the adjacent establishment, and although he knew of a criminal record, Officer
Wooldridge did not specifically identify any history of violence during his testimony.
7.

Although Officer Wooldridge testified that he had some concern because he didn't

know the other individual in the alley, the officer frisked Mr. Medina, the person that was
known to him, first; therefore, the Court finds that Officer Wooldridge did not objectively
evidence any heightened concern about the unknown person.
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The officer's stop of Defendant, and his companion, was completely justified based

on the activity the officer initially observed.
2.

The officer appropriately identified himself as a policeman, but before he made

reasonable inquiries he engaged in a Terry frisk of Mr. Medina.
3.

While a Terry frisk does not necessarily have to be deferred until reasonable inquiries

have been conducted, a frisk is not justified if something in the initial stages of the encounter
serves to dispel the officer's reasonable fear for his own or other's safety.
4.

Based on the Officer's testimony, and on his fairly significant acquaintenship with

Defendant, as well as the fact that Defendant was at a location fully justified by his
employment, which fact was known to the officer, the Court determines that a reasonable
officer's fears would have been appropriately dispelled and that the need for a frisk
dissipated before the frisk was undertaken.
5.

Accordingly, relying primarily on State v. White. 856 P 2d 656 (Utah 1993), the

Court finds that although the stop was justified, the frisk was not justified. For this reason,
the Defendant's Motion to Suppress all evidence discovered during the frisk is hereby
granted.
These Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law will constitute the order of the Court
and no further order is required. The Court hereby requests the attorney for Defendant to
schedule with the Court's clerk any future hearings required to resolve this matter.
Dated this Jin

day of April, 1997.
By the Court:

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed/delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law to Virginia Ward, Assistant City Prosecutor, 451 South 200
East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 and Stephanie Ames, Salt Lake Legal Defender
Association, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 0 F 7
day
of April, 1997.

